Abstract. Guarded(predicated) execution, as a new hardware feature, has been introduced into today's high performance processors. Guarded execution can signi cantly improve the performance of programs with conditional branches, and meanwhile also poses new challenges for conventional program analysis techniques. In this paper, we propose a static semantics inference mechanism to capture the semantics information of guards in the context of guarded code. Based on the semantics information, we extend the conventional de nitions regarding program analysis in guarded code, and develop the related guard-aware analysis techniques. These analyses include control ow analysis, data dependence analysis and data ow analysis as well.
Introduction
High performance compilation techniques rely heavily on e ective program analysis. Su cient and precise information on a program is critical to program optimization as well as to program parallelization.
Guarded(predicated) execution 10, 9] , as a new hardware feature, has been introduced into more and more high performance processors. This hardware feature provides an additional boolean register for each operation to guard whether the operation will be executed or not. If the value of the register is true, then the operation will be executed normally, otherwise the operation will be collapsed after initiating the execution of the operation. Such a register in an operation is termed the guard of the operation and the operation is said to be a guarded(predicated) operation. To support guarded execution, a compiler algorithm, called if-conversion 2, 9, 3, 6] , converts programs with conditional branches into guarded code. As a result, if-conversion removes conditional branches from programs. Figure 1 shows an example of guarded code, which has been if-converted from the control ow graph given on the left of the gure.
Guarded execution can signi cantly improve the performance of a program with conditional branches due to two main facts. First, if-conversion enlarges the size of basic blocks and thereby provides a large number of opportunities to extract the available parallelism from the enlarging scheduling scope. Second, the elimination of branches can avoid high branch misprediction penalties so as to does there exist any data-dependence between them? Will the value of variable x de ned in the rst operation be rede ned by the second operation? If we ignore the e ect of guards on the operations, the answer should be 'yes' to both questions. However, if the two guards g1 and g2 are disjoint(i.e. they never evaluate to true at same time), there is indeed no data-dependence between them. Only when g2 is always true as long as g1 is true, will the variable x in the rst operation be rede ned(killed) by the second operation and is not reachable(alive) after the second one. Hence, the logical relations among guards have to be taken into consideration in the analysis techniques. The authors in 4] have suggested P-facts to extract and represent the disjointedness relations between guards. These P-facts are used to analyze livevariable ranges for register allocation. But the extraction mechanism for disjointedness relations of guards is very sensitive to the instruction set architecture since it depends upon the instruction scheme of the HPL PlayDoh architecture 8]. Another data-structure for tracking guard relations, proposed in 7] , is the predicate partition graph. This graph-based data-structure is used to provide query information for data-ow analysis and register allocation in 5]. Similar to 4], the construction of the partition graph is based upon the HPL PlayDoh instruction set. A rather di erent approach developed in 12] is to apply reverse if-conversion to convert guarded code back to an explicit conditional branch structure where traditional analysis techniques can be applicable. In contrast, we expect to develop analysis techniques that would be directly applicable to guarded code.
In this paper, we propose a static semantics inference mechanism in the context of guarded code, which can capture the semantics information of guards directly from guarded code, and allows us to analyze the logical relations among guards.
Based on the semantics information, we extend the conventional de nitions regarding program analysis in the context of guarded code, and develop the related guard-aware analysis techniques. These guard-aware analyses include not only data-ow analysis but also control-ow and data-dependence analysis. The guard-aware control-ow analysis enables us to achieve the traditional results of control-ow analysis, such as dominance, post-dominance and controlequivalence, etc. The control-equivalence analysis has been used to reduce the number of guards required in guarded code. The guard-aware data-dependence analysis can avoid a lot of dependences so as to provide more opportunities for exploiting and extracting parallelism in guarded code.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the semantics inference mechanism. Section 3 presents the guard-aware control-ow analysis. The guard-aware data-dependence and data-ow analysis will be presented in Sect. 4 and Sect. 5, respectively. The last section gives the concluding remarks and outlines our future work.
Semantics Analysis for Guards
The semantics of a guard is a logical proposition which consists of predicate variables(i.e. branch conditions, e.g. p 1 and p 2 in the example of Fig. 1 ) and three basic logical operators(^; _ and :). That implies an operation will be executed only when its guard's semantics is true, i.e. the proposition evaluates to true.
A judgment C`S is introduced to denote that, from C, a given segment of guarded code, one can deduce S, a set of semantics of all guards in the guarded code. We have de ned three inference rules for the reduction of guard semantics as follows. 
Rule taut identi es that g 0 is a true-guard whose value is always true. Rule fork describes, if the semantics of guard g 1 is known as l 1 in S, after the execution of the guarded operation (g 1 ? g 2 = l 2 ), the semantics of guard g 2 is the proposition dnf 1 (l 1^l2 ), i.e. the conjunction of the g 1 's semantics l 1 and the condition l 2 under which the operations guarded by g 2 will be executed. The di erence of the third rule join from the second rule fork is that guard g 2 has already had a semantics de nition l 2 in S. Hence, the new semantics of g 2 after the guard operation (g 1 ? g 2 = l 3 ) should be dnf((l 1^l3 )_l 2 ), i.e. the disjunction of the current g 2 's semantics (l 1^l3 ) and the previous g 2 's semantics l 2 .
These three inference rules are applied to deduce the guard semantics for the above example in Fig. 1 . The detail for the inference procedure is demonstrated in the following table. The guarded operations in the rst column have been analyzed one by one via the use of the inference rules. The names of the rules applied to the operations are shown in the third column. The details of how to apply the rules to the operations are given in the second column. For instance, the only applicable rule is taut at the beginning of all the operations, as shown in the rst line. For the operation (g 0 ? g 1 = p 0 ), we can apply rule fork to obtain g 1 's semantics dnf(true^p 0 ), i.e. p 0 . For the operation (g 2 ? g 4 = true), g 4 A function Sem is employed to return the semantics of a guard. For example, Sem(g 0 ) = true, Sem(g 1 ) = p 0 and Sem(g 2 ) = :p 0 , etc.
An immediate application of the semantics set is dead-code elimination in the context of guarded code. We can eliminate those operations whose guards are false in the semantics set, because it is clear that this kind of operations will never be executed in any cases.
The semantics sets of guards also provides a good foundation for the analysis of guarded code. They enable us to analyze the logical relations between guards, and to develop the guard-aware analysis techniques. These analyses include control-ow, data-dependence and data-ow analysis, which are presented respectively in the following sections.
3 Guard-Aware Control Flow Analysis Although a lot of information about control ow paths has been lost in ifconverted code, we can still achieve some conventional results of control ow analysis, such as dominance, post-dominance and control-equivalence, etc, with the support of the semantics sets of guards obtained in the previous section.
Dominance analysis
Dominance is a fundamental concept in control ow analysis. A node m of a ow graph dominates node n if every path from the initial node of the ow graph to n goes through m, see 1] . This de nition implies that if node n is visited from the initial node along an arbitrary path, then m must have been visited along the path as well. We extend the de nition to guarded operations, 
De nition of Post-dominator
A guarded operation op2 post-dominates guarded operation op1 if each time op1 is executed, then op2 will de nitely be executed.
Pdom(op2; op1) = df (op1 4 op2)^Taut(Guard(op1) ! Guard(op2))
Let us have a look again at the example. It can be seen the last operation op15 post-dominates all the operations. In addition, the operations guarded by g 4 post-dominate those guarded by g 2 because Taut(Sem(g 2 ) ! Sem(g 4 )) ) Taut(:p 0 ! (:p 0 _ :p 1 )) ) true As a corollary, it is trivial to verify that any guarded operation dominates and post-dominates itself.
Control-equivalence
In general, we are interested in two kinds of control-ow relationships in the analysis of control-ow, control-dependence and control-equivalence. Most controldependences have been converted into data-dependences in if-converted code. The analysis of data-dependence will be presented in the next section. Here, we focus on the analysis of control-equivalence. ConEq(g 1 ; g 2 ) = df Taut(Sem(g 1 ) $ Sem(g 2 )) In the above example, g 0 is control-equivalent to g 5 as (true $ true) is a tautology. The operations guarded by g 0 are thus control-equivalent to those guarded by g 5 .
All guards that are mutually control-equivalent form a control-equivalence class. Because the guards in a control-equivalence class are control-equivalent, they can share the same name so as to reduce the number of required guards.
Therefore, the guarded code in the example can be improved by renaming g 5 to the control-equivalent guard g 0 , and eliminating all the operations for the assignment of g 5 . The improved guarded code as well as the original code are shown in Fig. 2 .
Remark: The functions Dom, Pdom and ConEq are applicable only to the operations in the same loop iteration. More precisely, given two operations op1 and op2 from a loop body, if Dom(op1; op2) evaluates to true, that just means op1 dominates op2 in the same iteration, and does not mean op1 from an iteration dominates op2 from another di erent iteration. This is not surprising because the traditional dominance relationship based on a control ow graph is also limited in the same iteration. It is possible that there is no dominance between two nodes from di erent iterations, even though conventional dominance analysis determines that one node dominates the other. Traditionally, data-dependences are divided into three classes,
Flow-dependence
An operation ow-depends on another operation if a variable used in the former is de ned by the latter.
Anti-dependence
An operation anti-depends on another operation if a variable de ned in the former is used by the latter.
3. Output-dependence An operation output-depends on another operation if the former de nes the same variables as the latter.
In fact, as Wolfe mentions in 13], there does not exist a data-dependence between two operations respectively from then and else edges of a conditional branch since they will never be executed at the same time. We further extend this fact as:
there exists no data-dependence between two operations that are never executed along the same execution path.
If two guarded operations are not executed along the same execution path, then the two guards of both operations don't evaluate to true at same time. Such operations are said to be disjoint. We use a boolean function Disjoint to determine whether two guarded operations are disjoint, i.e. Disjoint(op1; op2) = df Taut(:(Guard(op1)^Guard(op2)))
We formally extend the above data-dependence de nitions in the guard-aware data-dependence analysis.
ow-dependence:
Dflow(op1; op2) = df (op2 op1)^(Use(op1) \ Def(op2) 6 = )^:Disjoint(op1; op2) 2. Anti-dependence:
where (op2 op1) represents that an execution initiation for op2 is earlier than that for op1, as mentioned above. The function Use returns the set of all variables used(read) in an operation and the function Def returns the set of all variables de ned(written) in an operation.
Return to the example. The operation op9(g 2 ? y = x + 2) would have depended on op5(g 1 ? x = y + 1) if we had not taken take into account the e ects of the guards. However, Disjoint(op5; op9) ) Taut(:(Guard(op5)^Guard(op9))) ) Taut(:(Sem(g 1 )^Sem(g 2 ))) ) Taut(:(p 0^: p 0 )) ) true 5 Guard-Aware Data-Flow Analysis
Reaching de nition
The notion of reaching de nition concerns whether a de nition in an operation can reach some point of a program. Conventionally, a value of a variable dened in an operation op1 can reach another operation op2 if this variable is not rede ned along an execution path from op1 to op2, refer an example in 11].
We represent the reaching de nition in the presence of guarded code by a boolean function Reach.
Reach(op1; op2) = df (op1 op2)^(Def(op1) 6 = )^:Kill(op1; op2) where the additional condition (Def(op1) 6 = ) is used to guarantee that there is a variable de nition in the operation. The boolean function Kill represents whether or not a variable de nition in op1 would be killed by some operation between op1 and op2. A variable de nition in op1 is killed before reaching op2 when the guard of op1 evaluates to true, there is some operation between op1 and op2 that would rede ne this variable, and its guard always evaluates to true. Suppose the value of variable x de ned in op0 can reach op9 only when g 0 evaluates to true, and g 1 evaluates to false. Here, the question is how to determine statically that the value of (g 0^: g 1 ), i.e. (true^:p 0 ), is true or false. In fact, this is an undecidable problem at compile time even if we had the semantics set for the guards.
Compared with our reaching de nition, the value of x in op0 can reach op9 if g 1 does not always evaluate to true while g 0 evaluates to true. This implies that there exists a path(when g 1 is false) so that this value of x can ow through op5 and reach op9. This obviously agrees with the original reaching de nition.
Conversely, if g 1 always evaluates to true while g 0 evaluates to true, this implies that op5 post-dominates op0. In this case, the value of x in op0 will de nitely be killed by op5 in any case, and therefore can not reach op9. Moreover, it is a decidable problem to check whether a logical proposition is a tautology or not, as mentioned above.
Here In the next subsection, we utilize the two functions Reach and Kill to de ne the guard-aware data-ow equations.
Guard-aware data ow equations
Before giving the guard-aware data-ow equations, we recall the conventional equation for data-ow analysis. The information(for instance, variable de nitions) reaching the end of a basic block is that information which is either generated within the block or enters the beginning but is not killed by the block. For the sake of avoiding too many notations, the function names can be overloaded here.
In the context of guarded code, a basic block should be a maximal set of consecutive guarded operations with one entry point and one exit point, which is a so-called guarded block. Given such a guarded block GB, we can obtain the variable de nitions reaching the end of the guarded block via the analysis of the reaching de nition presented in the previous subsection. Suppose end is a virtual empty operation to represent the end point of GB, end is thus the successor of the last operation in GB. Table 3 gives the guard-aware data-ow equations. Table 3 . Guard-aware data-ow equations Out(GB) = df Gen(GB) (In(GB) ? K ill(GB)) where Gen(GB) = df f opi j (opi 2 GB)^Reach(opi; end) g I n(GB) = df S P 2pred(GB) Out(P ) K ill(GB) = df f opi j (opi 2 I n(GB))^K ill(opi ; end) g
The guarded code in the example of Fig. 1 forms a guarded block GB. Its Gen(GB) is f1; 2; 3; 4; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11g since the de nitions of variable x in operations 0,5,13 are killed before reaching the end of the block. The nal Out(GB) is same as the Gen(GB) because its In(GB) is empty.
An important application of data-ow equations is to analyze live-variable ranges for register allocation. We believe the above guard-aware data-ow analysis would form an essential base for developing guard-aware register allocation techniques.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a static semantics inference mechanism to capture the semantics information on guards, which provides a uni ed framework to develop the guard-aware analysis techniques, such as control ow analysis, data dependence analysis and data ow analysis. These guard-aware analyses provide the essential information to support optimizing and parallelizing compilation techniques on processors with guarded execution.
Guarded execution actually provides more opportunities and greater exibility for program optimization. In future work, we intend to develop the optimization techniques especially for guarded code.
